Canadian MP Seeks Answers on UAP from US Intel Officer
Many Questions, Few Answers. It’s Complicated.
Email records obtained through an access to information request reveal that on May 31, 2022, David Grusch, an American intelligence officer with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), was interviewed by Larry Maguire, a Member of Canada’s Parliament. During their private meeting, Maguire posed several questions regarding Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) and documented Grusch’s responses in detailed notes.
The various topics that were discussed included NORAD’s role in UAP data collection, information sharing between the United States and Canada, and characteristics of UAP. Subsequently, on June 3, 2022, Maguire emailed his interview notes to a senior official in the Office of the Chief Science Advisor (OCSA), asking to meet to discuss the issue of UAP.
The timing of the interview is significant as it highlights Larry Maguire’s early access to Mr. Grusch. It occurred more than a year before Grusch’s public testimony at the Congressional UAP hearing on July 26, 2023, and just six days after Grusch filed a UAP-related whistleblower complaint with the Intelligence Community Inspector General.
Unravelling the Truth
The process of discovery began in March 2024 when Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED) — the federal department that oversees OCSA — released the email that the senior bureaucrat in OCSA received from Larry Maguire on June 3, 2022. This first step took nine months from when the access to information request was submitted.
In his email, Mr. Maguire requested a one-on-one meeting with OCSA to discuss the UAP issue, and mentioned that he had a confidential meeting with a specific party. However, ISED redacted their identity and other key information. Maguire’s email also included a file titled “NGA Zoom Minutes.docx,” which he described as notes from the meeting, which ISED did not release despite the information request.
Consequently, an appeal was immediately filed with the Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) arguing for the full release of Maguire’s email and the file attachment. After almost a nine-month process, the OIC was not convinced that the redactions and withholding of certain information were justified. As a result, on November 29, 2024, ISED released the unredacted version of the email (shown below), along with partially redacted meeting notes.
Mr. Maguire’s email stated that he had met with the lead intelligence officer from the NGA, who is later identified as David Grusch in the interview notes which are included at the end of the article.
Also, according to the email, Maguire planned, at Grusch’s request, to invite Mr. Grusch to provide a classified briefing at a later date. However, the notion that this was even considered possible is perplexing. For Mr. Maguire to receive a classified briefing from Grusch, he would need to obtain security clearances from the U.S. Department of Defense and demonstrate a “need to know.” However, under U.S. law, only American citizens who are federal employees or contractors can be granted such clearances (though waivers exist for foreign nationals who have a unique skill or expertise). Since Maguire has no specialized skills related to national security, and is a Canadian citizen and foreign elected representative, he would not qualify for U.S. security clearances, making it impossible for him to participate in a classified briefing. Additionally, Mr. Maguire lacks Canadian security clearances as he is neither a federal cabinet member nor part of any defence or intelligence committee, which means he could not attend any classified Canadian briefing.
The Interview
In his seven-pages of interview notes, Mr. Maguire summarized David Grusch’s verbal responses to fourteen UAP-related questions, several of which are explored next.
Maguire began the interview by asking Grusch whether there is a preferred schedule for disclosure of UAP information. Grusch responded by saying that decision is beyond his authority level but suggested that a good way for the American government to acclimatize the public is by releasing some of the pilot videos that will be declassified. According to this, the U.S. possess compelling videos of UAP, which apparently will be declassified eventually.
While they were discussing who might hold historical Canadian UAP data, Mr. Grusch raised the topic of Project Magnet and Wilbert Smith. Later in the interview, Grusch also cited a claim, allegedly made by Smith, that the United States possessed a UFO “artifact.” For those unfamiliar, Wilbert Smith was an engineer with Canada’s Department of Transport who, in the early 1950s, participated in two UFO research initiatives sponsored by the Canadian government — Project Magnet and Project Second Storey. Although the government terminated both projects, Mr. Smith claimed that UFOs were extraterrestrial and the U.S. was secretly investigating them, based on an alleged conversation with an American scientist in 1950. However, Smith never produced any evidence to support his claims. He passed away in 1962.
Mr. Maguire also asked whether there had been recent interactions between American military or intelligence officials and their Canadian counterparts regarding UAP. David Grusch responded that three months earlier, the National Intelligence Manager for Aviation (NIM-A) from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence had met with the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) for classified briefings. This aligns with a CTV News report from November 2022 about a February 22, 2022 briefing by the UAP Task Force and NIM-A to the RCAF and Canadian Forces Intelligence Command. Furthermore, email records obtained via a previous access to information request show that members of the Directorate of Transnational and Regional Intelligence, part of Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, were invited in February 2022 to a UAP briefing, likely the same one reported by CTV News.
Next, Mr. Maguire asked if U.S. Space Command or NORAD had shared any UAP data or investigative techniques with Canadian military personnel. Unfortunately, Mr. Grusch’s response was fully redacted, leaving readers to speculate about the content of the discussion. Similarly, when Maguire inquired about NORAD’s role in collecting UAP data, Grusch’s response was obscured by several redactions.
Larry Maguire then inquired whether the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) or Communications Security Establishment (CSE) might take the lead on UAP issues in Canada. He focused these agencies since they are core components of Canada’s intelligence community — CSIS, which specializes in human intelligence, primarily focuses on counterterrorism, while CSE is dedicated to cybersecurity and foreign signals intelligence. Unfortunately, significant redactions once again shroud most of Grusch’s response in mystery.
Further into the interview, Mr. Maguire asked about the characteristics of UAP, including their shapes and sizes. In response, Grusch recounted an incident where a U.S. naval commander allegedly witnessed a 300-foot-long, triangle-shaped craft. However, redactions conceal most of the other information shared with Maguire.
Mr. Maguire also inquired about alternative methods for tracking UAP other than radar, and what actions can be taken to determine the intent of UAP. Regrettably, Grusch’s responses are masked by heavy redactions, leaving much to the imagination.
After delving into Maguire’s interview notes appended at the end of the article, one can’t help but wonder: What could possibly warrant the various redactions?
The Redactions
As part of the appeal process, the OIC issued a report on December 11, 2024, addressing ISED’s redactions in the released interview notes. Their report is included at the end of the article.
According to the OIC, ISED’s redactions pertain to non-public information that Mr. Maguire obtained confidentially and subsequently emailed to OCSA on June 3, 2022. ISED also deemed that such information effectively originated from the United States government as it was supplied by Mr. Grusch, a U.S. intelligence officer at the time. The OIC independently verified that the redacted information is not publicly available and was shared in confidence, and concurred that the redacted information shared by Grusch essentially originated from the U.S. government. However, it is important to note that neither ISED nor the OIC described the information as classified.
Additionally, after consulting with Global Affairs Canada, the country’s foreign affairs department, ISED concluded that the redacted information should not be disclosed without the consent of the United States. However, ISED did not seek their consent, as it was deemed unlikely that the Americans would permit the disclosure.
ISED also concluded that if the redacted information was released, it could potentially harm Canada’s international relations with the United States. The OIC confirmed that ISED provided them detailed information supporting such conclusion.
Although the OIC determined that ISED adhered to Canada’s access to information laws by redacting specific information in the interview notes, the appeal process proved invaluable in achieving greater transparency. It resulted in the full release of Mr. Maguire’s email and an intriguing, albeit partial, release of his interview notes.
Final Thoughts
Larry Maguire’s meeting with David Grusch is significant for several reasons. It is remarkable that Maguire, a Canadian politician, had early access to Grusch, over a year before his public Congressional testimony. While it’s uncertain how Maguire managed to arrange a meeting with Grusch, it is plausible that Luis Elizondo, the former head of the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program, played a role in facilitating it, considering he had met Maguire in February 2021, as reported by CTV News, and knows Grusch.
Additionally, the interview notes themselves are fascinating, not only for their content but also for the extensive redactions, which leave many questions unanswered.
Moreover, the interview raises additional questions beyond those posed by Mr. Maguire. For example, while Grusch referred to Wilbert Smith during the interview, it is unclear how seriously he took Smith’s unsubstantiated claims about UFOs and secret research. Was Grusch merely sharing UFO folklore, or did he regard Smith’s claims as significant and worthy of exploration?
Mr. Smith’s claims about secret UFO research in the 1950s mirror the allegations in Larry Maguire’s March 2023 letter to the Minister of National Defence regarding UAP. Similar allegations were also raised by OCSA staff during a briefing at National Defence Headquarters in May 2023, as reported in July 2024. This commonality among allegations raises the question of whether David Grusch’s interview comments about Wilbert Smith influenced Maguire and OCSA.
There is also another interesting question to ponder. Although Mr. Maguire is a Member of Parliament, he has little influence on government policies as he is not part of the governing Liberal Party. Also, as a backbencher in the Conservative Party, his status and influence inside his own party are somewhat muted. Additionally, his lack of membership in any defence or intelligence committees severely constrains his access to Canada’s national security agencies. Given these limitations, it is unclear what Grusch hoped to achieve by meeting with Maguire.
Ironically, despite being staunch supporters of greater transparency, Larry Maguire and David Grusch intended for their May 31, 2022 meeting to remain private. It was only uncovered through an access to information request and a subsequent appeal — an outcome neither likely anticipated. Had Mr. Maguire not emailed OCSA, the details surrounding his meeting with Grusch would have stayed private and inaccessible. While much of what Mr. Grusch shared with Maguire remains unknown, perhaps they might eventually share more details with the public. After all, their meeting was not classified. But, then again, we may simply remain in the dark.
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The Interview Notes:
The OIC’s Report:
